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The typical case arising under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act' (CERCLA) involves haz-
1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
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ardous waste generation2 and disposal spanning several decades by
companies no longer in existence. Subsequent attempts at cleanup by
federal and state governments and private parties, as well as legal bat-
tles over the ultimate responsibility, are also at issue in the typical
CERCLA case. A single party is rarely responsible for the toxic waste
pollution of a site. Usually, a toxic waste site, such as a landfill, will
have numerous potentially responsible parties (PRPs):5 generators;
transporters; current owners and their lessees; former owners and oper-
ators and their successor corporations; individual corporate officers; and
even governmental agencies. Ideally, the liability of each PRP would
equal its proportionate share of the cleanup costs.6
CERCLA, however, is a remedial rather than a fault based statute.
A person may be held fully liable for cleanup costs based solely on its
status as a PRP under section 107 of CERCLA, even if the person
neither caused nor contributed to the release of hazardous substances
at the site.' CERCLA's liability is retroactive,8 strict,9 joint and sev-
2. "Forty-three million metric tons of such waste were produced in 1981 alone .... Most of
this waste is not destroyed but stored-sealed by commercial waste facilities in 55-gallon drums
and deposited in clay-lined dumps, injected deep underground .... or abandoned in vacant lots,
lagoons, or landfills." Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1458,
1462 (1986) (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 661 F. Supp.
1416, 1424 n.10 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (noting that the Conservation Chemical site discharged 22,000
pounds of hazardous wastes into the groundwater annually, a release of 80,000 to 100,000 gallons of
contaminated water per day).
3. From 1956 until 1972, approximately 33,900,000 gallons of hazardous substances were
dumped into the Stringfellow Acid pits. See, e.g., Dubuc & Evans, Recent Developments Under
CERCLA: Toward a More Equitable Distribution of Liability, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,197 (June 1987); see also Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). From 1959 to 1979, more than 17,000 drums containing chemical
waste and 1,000,000 gallons of hazardous bulk liquid were deposited at the Lone Pine Landfill,
which ranked fifteenth on the national priorities list in 1985. Id. at 883.
4. See Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 686 F. Supp. 696, 697 (S.D. Ind.
1988) (noting that there were more than 350 PRPs connected with the Seymour site).
6. One of the goals of CERCLA is to ensure" 'that those responsible for problems caused by
the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful condi-
tions they created.'" Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(lst Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982)).
7. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). CERCLA de-
fines "person" to include "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium,
joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, po-
litical subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(21), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(21) (1982).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988) (reasoning
that CERCLA's retroactivity does not violate due process because its liability scheme is rationally
related to a valid legislative purpose), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Mot-
tolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 622 (D.N.H. 1988) (noting that CERCLA liability encompasses cleanup
costs resulting from acts that occurred prior to the enactment of CERCLA in December 1980).
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eral, 10 and subject to review only if the administrative record meets the
deferential arbitrary or capricious standard." If the government fears
that increasing the number of defendants will delay the trial or settle-
ment, it will file suit against only a handful of solvent PRPs.'2 There-
fore, a single contributor of a minor amount of hazardous waste or a
contributor of only mildly toxic waste can be held liable for the entire
costs of site cleanup merely because of its deep pocket.' With the aver-
age site cleanup cost ranging from twenty-one to thirty million dollars, 4
this is a grossly inequitable result.
In late 1986 Congress passed overwhelmingly the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)' 5 and revitalized
Superfund with an additional 8.5 billion dollars.' The 1986 amend-
ments to CERCLA and the recent cases arising from the amendments
9. See, e.g., Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042; see also United States v. Northeastern Pharma-
ceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
10. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Congress
deleted an express requirement of joint and several liability from the final CERCLA bill. The
deletion was not intended to reject joint and several liability, but rather to determine the scope of
liability under common-law principles. Id. at 808.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). This standard of review was added to CERCLA by
§ 113(c) of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986) (amending scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. IV 1986)) [herein-
after SARA]. Courts disagree on whether the arbitrary and capricious standard applies retroac-
tively. Compare Conservation Chem. Co., 661 F. Supp. at 1424-29 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (using equity
power authorized by CERCLA § 106(c) to avoid applying § 113(j) retroactively) with United States
v. Rohm & Haas, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 672, 676-77 (D.N.J. 1987) (applying § 113(j) retroactively to
cases pending at the time SARA became effective). But see United States v. Ottati & Goss, 694 F.
Supp, 977, 1001 (D.N.H. 1988) (refusing to decide the damage phase of a bifurcated trial solely on
the administrative record three months after SARA became effective).
12. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (docu-
menting the court's severing and staying of third-party actions brought against more than 300
impleaded parties in hope of advancing settlement negotiations between some or all of the 13
original defendants); Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 914 (N.D. Okla.
1987) (noting that the EPA denied the defendant site owner's request to join the PRP generators
because of the lengthy time required to identify and join the generators); United States v. Conser-
vation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (documenting the Department of Justice's
first use of joint and several liability by suing initially only four PRPs out of a total PRP pool of
more than 50 large contributors and 150 small contributors of toxic waste); see also Hall, Third-
Party Practice Under CERCLA, 1 A.Li-A.BA ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1205, 1211 (Seminar in
Boulder, Colorado, June 20-24, 1988).
13. See, e.g., Belthoff, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107 of CERCLA, 11
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 141 (1986).
14. SURVEYS AND INVESTIGATIONS STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, REPORT ON THE
STATUS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S SUPERFUND PROGRAM, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988), reprinted in Practical Approaches to Reduce Environmental Cleanup Costs, 317 P.L.I.
REAL EST. L. & PRAc. 405, 424 (1988) [hereinafter SUPERFUND REPORT].
15. See supra note 11.
16. SARA, supra note 11, § 517, 26 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. V 1987), established the Hazardous
Substances Superfund, which is a continuation of the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund
established by CERCLA, supra note 1, § 221, 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (repealed 1986).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1469
provide a more equitable distribution of cleanup responsibility by pro-
viding PRPs with a right of contribution,' creating an innocent land-
owner defense to liability, 8 improving settlement options for relatively
minor contributors of waste,' 9 granting covenants not to sue as positive
incentives to settle,20 encouraging PRPs to perform the cleanup actions
themselves,2' and allowing recoupment against state and local govern-
ments if the governments contributed to the environmental hazard.2"
This Note focuses on the 1987 and 1988 CERCLA decisions. These
cases build an analytical framework for future CERCLA actions in the
same way that many of the early CERCLA decisions established key
principles beyond CERCLA's statutory wording,23 and laid the founda-
tion for SARA. 4
Once the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) targets a toxic
waste site listed on the national priorities list (NPL) for cleanup, it has
several options of response and recovery under CERCLA.25 The EPA
may undertake settlement negotiations with the PRPs for an upfront
payment of cleanup costs or it may agree to allow the PRPs to execute
the cleanup. If settlement negotiations fail, section 104 authorizes the
EPA to respond directly and clean up the site.20 Financing for the
17. SARA, supra note 11, § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); see infra notes
146-52 and accompanying text.
18. SARA, supra note 11, § 101(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A) (Supp. IV 1986); see CERCLA,
supra note 1, § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982); see also infra notes 58-63 and accompanying
text.
19. SARA, supra note 11, § 122(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1986); see infra notes
121-25 and accompanying text.
20. SARA, supra note 11, § 122(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (Supp. IV 1986); see infra notes 114-20
and accompanying text.
21. SARA, supra note 11, § 122(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); see infra notes
112-13 and accompanying text.
22. SARA, supra note 11, § 101(20)(D), 42 US.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. IV 1986); see infra
notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding
that CERCLA imposes strict liability even absent an express provision in the final statute); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (find-
ing corporate officers liable for the hazardous waste disposal practices of the corporate entity),
aff'd, 810 F.2d 726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (first court holding that parties sued by the govern-
ment under CERCLA § 107 are jointly and severally liable).
24. See, e.g., Webner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (rec-
ognizing a right to contribution among joint tortfeasors).
25. See SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 14, at 415, 428-29. The NPL is the EPA's ranking of
disposal sites that substantially endanger public health and welfare. As of January 1988, the NPL
targeted 951 sites for remedial cleanup actions. Id. at 415.
26. See CERCLA, supra note 1, § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982) (authorizing the EPA to take
direct cleanup measures whenever there is a release or threatened release of toxic substances into
the environment). The National Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.86 (1988), provides
the guidelines for response actions. Response includes short-term removal and long-term remedial
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cleanup comes through Superfund.2  The EPA may seek reimbursement
from PRPs pursuant to section 107. Alternately, section 106 authorizes
the EPA to compel PRPs to clean up the site"8 or the EPA may refer
the case to the Department of Justice, which may file suit in federal
court for the same purpose. PRPs may resume settlement negotiations
with the EPA or litigate the liability issue. This Note refers to these
interactions between the government and the PRPs as the first tier of
CERCLA actions.
Settling parties and parties held liable under section 106 or 107
may then pursue cost recovery actions by bringing contribution or in-
demnity suits against nonparticipating PRPs in federal court pursuant
to section 107.29 The pool of defendants includes generators and trans-
porters of hazardous wastes, and both the current and former owners
and operators of hazardous waste facilities. PRPs may initiate volun-
tary cleanup actions prior to EPA action and sue other PRPs pursuant
to section 107, thereby avoiding first tier interaction."0 Actions initiated
by PRPs against other PRPs liable expressly under section 107 will be
referred to as second tier CERCLA suits.
If second tier CERCLA actions do not reduce liability to an ap-
proximation of fairness because of the unrecoverable shares of bank-
rupt, defunct, or judgment-proof parties, settling PRPs and PRPs held
liable under section 106 or 107 may attempt to spread their CERCLA
liability among parties that are beyond the express scope of section 107.
Other potential parties for sharing CERCLA liabilities include contract
indemnifiers, officers and individual shareholders of corporations, par-
cleanup actions and any related enforcement activities. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (Supp. IV 1986). CER-
CLA defines and lists examples of removal and response actions. See CERCLA, supra note 1, §
101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1982); id. § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). Only sites listed on the
NPL are eligible for Superfund financed remedial cleanup by the EPA. Prior to initiating a reme-
dial action, the EPA makes a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) to determine the
optimum cleanup strategy and evaluate the relative effectiveness and costs of alternative ap-
proaches. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i). Following the completion of the RI/FS, the EPA sets forth its
selected remedy in a Record of Decision (ROD). The EPA estimates that the average ROD repre-
sents the culmination of five years of study and investigation. See SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note
14, at 415.
In contrast, removal actions such as installing security fencing or removing drums of hazard-
ous waste to an approved safe disposal site may be undertaken at any site, even those not included
on the NPL. They are limited to one year in length and $2 million in costs. Id.; see also Shore
Realty, 759 F.2d at 1046-47.
27. See CERCLA, supra note 1, § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982) (authorizing reimbursement
of response costs by Superfund).
28. See id. § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606. The government is authorized to recover from PRPs "all
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan." Id. § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
29. See id. § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
30. Id.
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ent or successor corporations, and manufacturers of hazardous sub-
stances. This Note labels PRP initiated suits against defendants that
are outside the express scope of section 107 of CERCLA as third tier
CERCLA actions.
This Note analyzes the various options and strategies that a PRP
may use to limit its CERCLA liability to its proportionate fair share of
cleanup costs. In order to achieve an approximation of liability based
on fault, the PRP must spread the liability among the greatest number
of possible contributors to the hazardous waste problem. Part II exam-
ines a PRP's settlement and litigation options in first tier interactions
and addresses the liability of a PRP to the government for cleanup
costs. Part III addresses the second tier of CERCLA interactions, con-
tribution suits against other section 107 PRPs. Part IV focuses on third
tier actions and suggests possible strategies when a PRP is faced with
insolvent or defunct PRPs. Finally, Part V summarizes the strategies
available to achieve the fairest possible allocation of costs and describes
techniques for locating a maximum number of PRPs.
II. FIRST TIER LIABILITY-INTERACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT
Section 107 of CERCLA imposes strict liability for the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites on four categories of PRPs: The current owner
and operator of a hazardous waste facility; the owner or operator at the
time the waste was deposited at the site; generators of waste sent to the
site; and transporters of waste sent to the site. 1 The United States has
a prima facie case against a section 107 PRP when it incurs responses2
costs resulting from a "release"33 or threatened release of a "hazardous
substance"3 4 from a "facility."35 The PRP is strictly liable unless it can
31. See id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
32. See supra note 26.
33. See CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982) (defining release).
SARA expanded the definition of release to include barrels of hazardous substances or pollutants
that are not leaking. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 184, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3276, 3277.
34. See CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982) (defining hazardous
substance by incorporating the substances listed as hazardous or toxic under the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903, 6921 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)
(1982), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(a), 1321(b)(2)(A) (1982), and the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1982)). CERCLA authorizes the EPA to designate additional sub-
stances that "may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment."
CERCLA, supra note 1, § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (1982). CERCLA excludes pesticide applica-
tions approved by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, see id. § 103(e), 42
U.S.C. § 9603(e), oil spills, see id. § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), and radioactive releases from
licensed facilities in nuclear accidents or in the course of uranium mining, see id. § 101(10)(K), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(10)(K).
35. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982). CERCLA's broad definition
of facility encompasses more than landfills and dump sites. See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F.
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assert a valid defense.83
Any person3 7 linked by even a tenuous thread to a site where haz-
ardous wastes have been released"8 should assess its liability promptly.
If the person qualifies as a PRP under section 107, it should assume
that it may be held jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs. It may
choose to avoid first tier interaction with the government by voluntary
cleanup prior to government involvement. The PRP can then proceed
to second tier interaction by pursuing private cost recovery actions
against other PRPs."9 If the PRP's claim for response costs is not satis-
fied within sixty days,' ° the PRP may assert recovery under Superfund
for the costs necessary and consistent with the National Contingency
Plan (NCP)."
Alternatively, the person may choose to wait until the government
targets it as a PRP, and then address the issue of whether it should
settle or litigate. The strength of a PRP's possible defense to CERCLA
will influence the PRP's decision to settle with the government or liti-
gate. If there is no settlement, the government may sue a PRP to force
cleanup under section 106 or to recover cleanup costs under section 107.
Because liability is joint and several, the government need not join all
PRPs. The PRP defendant may implead 2 other PRPs as third-party
defendants by merely asserting that the third-party defendant "may be
liable for all or part of the plaintiff's claim.' 43
Supp. 1298, 1305 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (holding that a facility includes "any place where hazardous
substances come to be located" such as the containers and trucks from which the substances were
released). A building containing any hazardous substance may be a facility. See CERCLA, supra
note 1, § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.1-.33 (1988) (containing
lists and descriptions of many hazardous substances).
36. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting a
causation requirement and recognizing that CERCLA imposes strict liability).
37. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
38. See CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982). Section 101(22) de-
fines release to include "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandon-
ment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant)." Id.
39. Id. § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
40. Id. § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a); see also Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F.
Supp. 1563, 1574 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
41. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 111(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (1982); see also supra note 26;
infra note 134.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). The plaintiff or third-party defendants may defeat this strategy,
however, with successful motions to strike the third-party claims or to sever the trial.
43. See CERCLA, supra note 1, § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982).
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A. Defenses to CERCLA
The majority of courts do not recognize equitable defenses to CER-
CLA liability."" Traditional common-law defenses such as retroactivity
and lack of causation or negligence are not defenses to CERCLA liabil-
ity.45 CERCLA limits valid defenses to federally permitted releases,46
and acts solely caused by God, 7 war, 8 or an unrelated third party.49 In
order to assert a successful third-party defense, the PRP must prove
four elements by a preponderance of the evidence: A third party solely
caused the release; the third party was not contractually related to the
defendant; the defendant exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous substances; and the defendant took precautions against the third
party's foreseeable acts or omissions and their foreseeable
consequences.50
The "caused solely by" requirement may be a formidable limitation
to the successful assertion of a section 107(b) defense. The 1988 deci-
sion of United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics"' found a prede-
cessor owner liable under section 107(a)(2). The predecessor owner
44. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061-62 (C.D. Cal. 1987). For
an example of the minority position, see United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 626-29
(D.N.H. 1988) (recognizing the equitable defense of waiver and release against the government).
45. See, e.g., Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1062 (finding the following non-107(b) affirmative
defenses relevant to the issue of damages but not liability- comparative fault, contributory negli-
gence, § 104 related defenses, due care, failure to comply with the NCP, failure to comply with
claims procedures pursuant to § 112, and set-off); see also United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp.
898 (D.N.H. 1985) (limiting the three year statute of limitations of CERCLA § 112(d) to actions
for natural resource damages only, not to § 107 actions brought by federal or state governments).
In Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc. the court noted that in a one-site case where
pollution occurs at the location of the release, the causal connection may be presumed absent proof
of no actual disposal at the site or total removal of wastes at the site. 689 F. Supp. 1223, 1225-26
(D. Mass. 1988). In a two-site case where the hazardous substances migrate to cause pollution at a
site different from the release location, the Dedham court found strict liability inappropriate un-
less the defendant's releases caused any effect upon the plaintiff's site. Id.
46. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 107(j), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j) (1982). Federally permitted release
is defined by id. § 101(10), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10).
47. Id. § 107(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1). Act of God is defined by id. § 101(1), 42 U.S.C. §
9601(1). See Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1061. The State of California released intentionally
1,500,000 gallons of liquid waste into a navigable body of water fearing that heavy rains would
collapse the Stringfellow waste facility. The Stringfellow court rejected heavy rainfall as an Act of
God because rain is foreseeable and better designed drain channels could have prevented the dam-
age. Id. See generally Dubuc & Evans, supra note 3.
48. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 107(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2) (1982).
49. Id. § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3); see, e.g., Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1062 (not-
ing that the third party cannot be a state).
50. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982); see Jersey City Redev.
Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257, 1261 (D.N.J. 1987); see also O'Neill v. Piccillo, 682 F.
Supp. 706, 728 (D.R.I. 1988) (invoking the third-party defense shifts the burden of proof of causa-
tion to the defendant), aff'd, No. 88-1551 (1st Cir. Aug. 21, 1989) (WEsTLAw, Allfeds database, 1989
WL 94,520).
51. 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
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admitted releasing hazardous wastes at Love Canal from 1942 to 1953
but produced expert testimony to support its claims of proper and
nonharmful disposal during its period of ownership. The expert testi-
fied that the contamination resulted from the improper disposal prac-
tices of the subsequent owners.2 The Hooker court denied the defense.
It concluded that because the predecessor owner's disposal practices
contributed to the subsequent horizontal migration of the hazardous
wastes, a third party did not solely cause the Love Canal
contamination.5
Courts interpret liberally the contractual relationship bar. One fed-
eral district court indicated that generators may be liable for cleanup
costs at the site although their contracts with the transporter stated
expressly that the generator's wastes would be disposed of at another
facility. 4 In a similar fact situation, defendant generators claimed a
third-party defense based on their proper turnover of wastes to licensed
transporters lacking contractual ties to the dump where the defendants'
waste was discovered later in identifiable containers. 5 Although the
transporters' subcontractors disposed of the waste at sites other than
those listed on the transportation contract, the court found that an in-
direct contractual relationship existed between the defendants and the
licensed transporters and their subcontractors. This relationship barred
the third-party defense.5 6 Courts also imposed liability on innocent pur-
chasers of hazardous waste sites merely on the basis of the purchase
and sale agreement.57
In contrast, SARA's definition of "contractual relationship" ex-
cludes purchasers who acquired property after hazardous substances
were placed on it, with no knowledge or reason to know of their exis-
tence. 8 In addition, SARA imposes a positive duty on purchasers to
investigate the previous ownership and usage of the property "consis-
tent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to mini-
mize liability. ' 59 In the 1988 decision of United States v. Serafinie the
52. Id. at 555.
53. Id. at 558-59.
54. See Missouri v. Independent Petrochem. Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4, 5 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
55. O'Neill, 682 F. Supp. at 727-28.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048 n.23 (2d Cir. 1985).
58. SARA, supra note 11, § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
59. Id. § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). Some states enacted statutory disclosure obli-
gations requiring owners of real property to inform purchasers of any known contamination. In
California, if the owner knows or has reasonable cause to believe hazardous wastes were released
on or beneath the property and fails to give written notice to the buyer prior to the sale, the owner
is liable for actual damages. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25,359.7 (West Supp. 1989). Other
states require notice of contamination to be recorded in real property records. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -35 (West Supp. 1988).
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Government argued that the presence of hundreds of abandoned waste
drums on the site at the time of purchase precluded the defendants
from attaining innocent purchaser status." The defendants neither per-
formed an on-site inspection prior to purchase nor inquired into the
past uses of the site.6 2 The district court denied the Government's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the issue of CERCLA liability because
of a lack of evidence that the defendants' failure to inspect was con-
trary to accepted commercial or customary practice.6 3 Thus, a truly in-
nocent purchaser may assert a successful third-party defense if a
reasonable inspection and inquiry is made in accordance with standard
commercial or customary practice.
B. Litigation Against the Government
1. Allocation of Costs
If a court rejects a PRP's defense to CERCLA and liability is es-
tablished, the court assesses response costs. A split of authority exists
regarding the allocation of response costs among liable parties. The ma-
jority of courts follow United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.4 in adopting
the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach. The court first deter-
mines whether the harm is divisible.6 If the harm is divisible, the bur-
den of proof of apportionment is upon the PRP.e7 The most popular
60. 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
61. Id. at 1163. In 1983 the EPA found the Taylor waste site littered with 55-gallon drums
containing hazardous substances lying "open, crushed, completely or partially buried, and in vari-
ous stages of decay." Id.
62. Id. at 1167.
63. The Serafini court suggested that affidavits from real estate developers in the area stat-
ing that it is the customary practice to inspect similar property prior to purchase would be rele-
vant to assessing the duty to inspect. Id. at 1168.
64. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). In 1986 Congress adopted the Chem-Dyne/Restate-
ment approach tempered by "'case by case evaluation of the complex factual scenarios associated
with multiple-generator waste sites.'" H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 74, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2856 (quoting Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808).
65. A tortfeasor's liability varies depending on whether the harm is divisible or indivisible.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433(A), 433(B), 875, 881 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS].
66. See id. § 433(A). The Restatement states:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single
harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.
Id.; see also United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (agreeing with
the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 65, § 434 comment d statement that whether the harm is
divisible is a question of law and should be considered on a motion for summary judgment).
67. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 65, § 433(B)(2). The Restatement notes:
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to
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theory of apportionment is the volumetric approach, which calculates
the liability of each generator in proportion to the number of its drums
containing hazardous waste found at the site. In addition to volume, a
1988 Fourth Circuit decision found the amount of commingling of haz-
ardous substances relevant to apportionment.6 9 Other courts consider
comparative fault when allocating costs.7 0 If the EPA performs site
cleanup in phases, it may allocate the costs of phase specific remedial
actions among the contributors of those specific waste types and
volumes.7 1 For example, only the polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) con-
tributors might bear the costs of incinerating PCB contaminated soil.7 2
The volumetric approach is appealing in situations in which divisi-
ble harm allows apportionable cleanup costs. Proportional division of
liability is fairer than placing the entire burden of cleanup on a few
PRPs. The volumetric approach also encourages generators to mark
and label clearly their wastes and to take adequate precautions in dis-
posing of wastes.7s Apportionment is appropriate only when the wastes
the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the
harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment
is upon each such actor.
Id.; see also O'Neill v. Piccillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 724 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, No. 88-1551 (1st Cir. Aug.
21, 1989) (WESTLAw, allfeds database, 1989 WL 94,520).
68. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 65, § 433(A); see also O'Neill, 682 F. Supp. at
724-25 (noting that the volumetric method is an appropriate way of apportioning liability among
generators if all the drums contained identical wastes); cf. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811 (cau-
tioning that volume alone "is not an accurate predictor of the risk associated with the waste be-
cause the toxicity or migratory potential of a particular hazardous substance generally varies
independently with the volume of the waste").
69. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 n.26 (4th Cir. 1988) (listing factors,
other than volume, relevant to establishing divisibility of harm such as "evidence disclosing the
relative toxicity, migratory potential, and synergistic capacity of the hazardous substances at the
site"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
70. See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 402 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(stating that it will not "tolerate a 'windfall' or 'wipeout' which results in an apportionment of
liability which arbitrarily or unreasonably ignores the comparative fault of the parties, where there
is a reasonable basis for allowing that comparison to be made").
71. See EPA Memorandum: Interim Guidelines for Preparing Nonbinding Preliminary Allo-
cations of Responsibility (May 16, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 19,919-20 (1986) [hereinafter NBAR Memo-
randum], reprinted in 17 [Administrative Materials] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,065 (Oct.
1987) [hereinafter Envtl. L. Rep.]. For example, the EPA initially may clean up soil contamination
and remove waste barrels before beginning the more time-consuming task of remediating ground-
water. See SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 14, at 415.
72. See NBAR Memorandum, supra note 71, at 19,920, reprinted in Envtl. L. Rep., supra
note 71, at 35,066; cf. O'Neill, 682 F. Supp. at 724-25 (disregarding defendant's argument that
because none of its waste drums were found in the first two years of cleanup, defendant should not
be liable for cleanup costs incurred during those years).
73. See generally O'Neill, 682 F. Supp. at 720, 722. Adequate disposal precautions would
include separating the wastes by category, packing compatible wastes in metal drums cushioned
with vermiculite and other absorbent materials, clearly labeling the drums as to content and gener-
ator, and arranging for their disposal through a licensed transporter.
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are equivalent in toxicity as well as volume, the waste drums are sealed,
and no leaking or commingling of wastes has occurred. There is, how-
ever, no clearcut way of apportioning costs among parties other than
generators.
In most cleanup actions, the wastes are commingled and indivisi-
ble, 7 4 and the government uses the Chem-Dyne theory to impose joint
and several liability to obtain a full recovery of cleanup costs from any
one or more solvent PRPs. 5 Prior to SARA, one federal district court
decision adopted a more moderate approach, rejecting joint and several
liability for indivisible harm in favor of a fairer apportionment of liabil-
ity.7 ' In apportioning the costs between the PRPs, the court considered
the following equitable factors, which originated in the Gore Amend-
ment to the original House CERCLA bill:77 The ability to identify and
separate the wastes contributed by each party; the amount and toxicity
of the hazardous wastes; the PRP's degree of involvement in the gener-
ation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous
waste; the degree of care that the PRP exercised; and the PRP's coop-
eration with the government. In addition to promoting fairness by not
imposing joint and several liability on minor contributors, these equita-
ble factors are suitable for enforcement actions involving PRPs other
than generators. 8
Although the legislative history of SARA fully supports the Chem-
Dyne rule of joint and several liability in the litigation of indivisible
harm cases brought by the Government as plaintiff, SARA does recog-
nize a court's discretion in considering equitable factors, such as the
Gore criteria, when allocating costs in suits between private parties.7 9
74. The legislative history of CERCLA states that hazardous wastes will be considered an
indivisible harm if "many parties have contributed to the contamination or other endangerment
and there are no reliable records indicating who disposed of the hazardous wastes (or in what
quantities)." 126 CONG. REc. 31,966 (1980) (letter from Alan A. Parker, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office
of Legislative Affairs); see also United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (labeling the damage at the Stringfellow site as indivisible between the PRPs due to the
"synergistic effects of the commingling of different wastes").
75. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810. The Chem-Dyne court relied upon the Restatement,
which states that "[e]ach of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single
and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire
harm." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 65, § 875.
76. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
77. 126 CONG. REC. 26,781 (1980). Prior to the enactment of CERCLA, the House passed the
Gore Amendment to modify the Restatement approach to joint and several liability. Id. at 26,782-
85, 26,799. The Senate, however, did not adopt the Gore Amendment. See id. at 31,965.
78. A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1256-57 (discussing Congress's approach to joint and
several liability).
79. SARA added a modified Gore approach for settlement. Section 122(e) authorizes the
EPA to provide a nonbinding preliminary allocation of responsibility (NBAR) among PRPs during
settlement procedures. SARA, supra note 11, § 122(e)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1986);
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Therefore, the PRP, held jointly and severally liable to the government,
may limit the amount of damages it ultimately will have to pay by
bringing contribution suits against other PRPs. In these second tier
CERCLA actions, the majority of courts will consider equitable factors
in apportioning the damages among the PRPs.
2. Counterclaims and Third-Party Practice Against the Government
CERCLA waives the sovereign immunity of the federal govern-
ment.80 If the federal government's activities fall within the scope of
section 107, it qualifies as a PRP and the defendant PRP may assert a
counterclaim in recoupment.8 1 Although the PRP will not be able to
obtain an affirmative recovery from the federal government, a success-
ful claim reduces its cleanup cost liability. 2 Prior to the 1986 amend-
ments, it was unclear whether CERCLA waived the sovereign immunity
of state and local governments. Commentators argued that state and
local governments waived sovereign immunity if they generated or dis-
posed of hazardous waste or encouraged similar activities as a means of
furthering economic development and expanding the tax base,83 but not
if they acted in a regulatory capacity.8 4 One court permitted a counter-
claim asserted defensively in recoupment against a state on an implied
waiver theory if the counterclaim related to the primary claim brought
by the state,8 5 but the court refused to recognize affirmative counter-
see infra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc.,
691 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (arguing that the 1986 Congress did not reject the
moderate Gore-type approach in contribution actions between PRPs); Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
at 1060 (noting that the court's "discretion in apportioning damages among the defendants during
the contribution phase does not effect the defendants' liability").
80. SARA amended and recodified the original CERCLA § 107(g) waiver to read as follows:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply with,
this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively,
as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title.
SARA, supra note 11, § 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
81. See, e.g., EEOC v. First Nat'l Bank, 614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring a
defendant's recoupment counterclaim to state a claim against the government arising out of the
same transaction), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
82. Id.
83. Many state and local governments encouraged local industry to transport and dispose of
their waste at local hazardous waste dump sites and landfills. See Dubuc & Evans, supra note 3, at
10,202.
84. See Hall, supra note 12, at 1205, 1211 (noting the difficulty in showing the government's
regulatory act involving the disposal of hazardous waste breached a duty of reasonable care owed
to the counterclaimant).
85. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985). Mottolo requested that
the State of New Hampshire be denied reimbursement because its failure to conduct and supervise
adequately the cleanup operations added to the cleanup costs. Id. at 910. The court noted that
when New Hampshire filed suit as a plaintiff in a federal court, it waived any sovereign immunity
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claims for indemnification and contribution against a state."e
Recently, the United States Supreme Court remanded United
States v. Union Gas Co. to the Third Circuit to address the issue of
whether, under the 1986 amendments, states can be held liable in fed-
eral court for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites.8" In 1980
state excavation pursuant to a flood control project caused a coal tar
spill at the site of an abandoned plant owned by the predecessors of the
defendant.8 When the federal government sued the defendant for half
of the cleanup costs, the defendant filed a third-party complaint against
the state and local governments claiming their excavation work negli-
gently caused, or contributed to, the discharge."9 On remand, the Third
Circuit allowed the counterclaim based on SARA's explicit inclusion of
state and local governments within its definition of "owner or opera-
tor."90 Therefore, under SARA, state and local governments are clearly
PRPs if they acted as "owners or operators."9 '
In the 1988 case of United States v. Dart Industries the Fourth
Circuit held that a state could be a PRP under SARA but limited the
state's liability to those actions outside the scope of governmental regu-
lation.92 The defendant filed a third-party complaint against the South
or eleventh amendment immunity claims. Id.
86. Id. at 911.
87. United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas I), 792 F. 2d 372 (3d Cir.), vacated & re-
manded 479 U.S. 1025 (1986).
88. See United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas II), 832 F. 2d 1343, 1345 (3d Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
89. Union Gas settled with the federal government but appealed the dismissal of its third-
party claim against the state and local governments. United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas
I), 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir.), vacated & remanded, 479 U.S.
1025 (1986).
90. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1347-48. SARA added a new clause to the definition of "owner
or operator" reading:
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local government which
acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandon-
ment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of
its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any
State or local government which has caused or contributed to the release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State or local government shall be
subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both
procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under sec-
tion 9607 of this title.
SARA, supra note 11, § 101(20)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
91. The Third Circuit expanded its holding to include pending suits initiated before SARA,
in addition to post-SARA actions. See Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1357 n.. The court reasoned
that states would not be immune from suit in pending cases, as well as those initiated after SARA,
because Congress intended that SARA merely clarify the already existing law. Id.; see H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 962, supra note 33, at 185-86, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3278-
79.
92. 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Carolina Department of Health and Environment. The complaint al-
leged that the state qualified as an "owner or operator" because of the
state's following actions: Granting permits to store wastes at the Fort
Lawn site; inspecting the site; regulating the transportation of wastes
shipped to the site; and failing to install monitoring wells on the site or
to facilitate cleanup as promised." The Fourth Circuit held that to
qualify as an "owner or operator," a state either must directly manage
employees and finances at the toxic waste site, or contribute to the re-
lease of hazardous wastes through its own "hands on" activities."4 Mere
regulatory actions do not bring a state within the scope of section 107
liability.9"
C. Settlement with the Government
CERCLA lacked an explicit settlement provision until the 1986
amendments. Section 122 of SARA expressly authorizes the EPA to
enter into settlement agreements permitting eligible PRPs to clean up
the site if it is within the public interest. 6 Since 1986 the EPA success-
fully obtained settlements for many sites, some of which involved large
numbers of PRPs and high cleanup costs.9 7 The EPA's goal is the re-
covery of one hundred percent of cleanup costs in settlement, thereby
expediting remedial cleanup action and minimizing transaction and liti-
gation costs.98 The settlement decision is at the absolute discretion of
the EPA and not subject to judicial review.9 SARA encourages PRPs to
settle with the EPA in several ways: By allocating response costs among
the PRPs, which avoids joint and several liability; making partial settle-
ments available in some circumstances; releasing settling parties by giv-
93. Id. at 146.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. SARA, supra note 11, § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (Supp. IV 1986).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., CA 88-1786-WF (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 1988).
Under a 1988 consent decree, 48 parties agreed to pay $33.1 million towards the cleanup of four
hazardous waste sites located in New Hampshire and Massachusetts. Settling parties included 21
owners and 27 of the largest generators and transporters of hazardous waste to the sites. According
to EPA Regional Administrator Michael Deland, the $17 million cash payment to reimburse state
and federal agencies for past cleanup costs is the largest obtained in a CERCLA cost recovery suit.
The parties also agreed to clean up three of the four sites at an estimated cost of $16.1 million.
More than 300 small volume generators had agreed previously to pay $14.6 million and perform
$1.5 million in cleanup work. The $49.2 million total recovery meets 84% of the total estimated
cost of cleanup of the four sites. The federal government then filed suit against 25 nonsettling
PRPs. Deland acknowledged the government's intent to prosecute the nonsettling PRPs to the
fullest extent of the law. See $33.1 Million Settlement Reached in Cleanup of Cannons
Superfund Sites 19 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 613 (Aug. 1988).
98. See SARA, supra note 11, § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (Supp. IV 1986); see also NBAR
Memorandum, supra note 71, at 19,919, reprinted in Envtl. L. Rep., supra note 71, at 35,065-66.
99. See SARA, supra note 11, § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
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ing covenants not to sue; and giving de minimis contributors favorable
treatment.
To expedite settlements, SARA gives the EPA the discretion to al-
locate one hundred percent of the response costs among the PRPs
before cleanup by preparing nonbinding allocations of responsibility
(NBAR). 00 The EPA normally prepares the NBAR during the remedial
investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS). A NBAR may proportion
liability for all sites, even those with commingled indivisible waste.10
Unlike the cost allocation made in litigation, the NBAR provides guid-
ance on the division of costs among different classes of PRPs. First, the
NBAR allocates one hundred percent of liability among generators
based on volume. 02 Second, the EPA adjusts the percentages of liabil-
ity based on equitable settlement criteria similar to the Gore factors.
0 3
Third, the EPA may require owner, operator, and transporter PRPs to
share in the costs. 10 4 The volume of waste transported and the method
of disposal at the site are relevant to the allocation of liability between
transporters."0 5 The EPA divides liability between successive owners or
operators based on each party's commercial knowledge, relative length
of time of ownership or operation, and degree of active involvement in
the hazardous waste disposal. 06 Last, the EPA reallocates the shares of
defunct or insolvent parties among the solvent PRPs.10 7 PRPs may be
credited for any previous removal actions or contributions to the RI/FS
at the site. 08 After receiving the NBAR, the PRPs may make the EPA
a settlement offer. 0 9
100. SARA, supra note 11, § 122(e)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1986); see NBAR
Memorandum, supra note 71, at 19,919, reprinted in Envtl. L. Rep., supra note 71, at 35,065-66.
The EPA may prepare a NBAR if it has sufficient data to enable it to allocate costs and it reasona-
bly believes the NBAR may promote settlement. Situations in which a NBAR might accelerate
settlement include: A request from a majority of the PRPs; the existence of a state or local govern-
ment that is a PRP; and the existence of a large number of de minimis generators. All pre-RI/FS
notice letters inform PRPs of the NBAR option, conditioned on a significant percentage of PRPs
requesting it within 30 days of receipt of notice. The agreements are "non-binding" as the PRPs
may adjust the percentages allocated by EPA among themselves. Id.
101. See id. at 19,919-20, reprinted in Envtl. L. Rep., supra note 71, at 35, 066.
102. See id. The EPA rejected a method of apportionment based on toxicity of wastes be-
cause of difficulty in application, disagreement on the degrees of toxicity, and the lack of a clear
relationship between toxicity and cleanup expenses. Id. at 19,920, reprinted in Envtl. L. Rep.,
supra note 71, at 35,065.
103. See id. at 19,920, reprinted in Envtl. L. Rep., supra note 71, at 35,066; see also supra
notes 77, 78, and accompanying text.
104. See NBAR Memorandum, supra note 71, at 19,920, reprinted in Envtl. L. Rep., supra
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SARA authorizes three types of "mixed" funding settlements in
which both the PRPs and Superfund share the expenses of cleanup."'
In a "cash-out" settlement, the PRPs pay the EPA at the outset, and
the EPA performs the cleanup."' In a "mixed work" agreement, the
PRPs and the EPA each agree to perform and pay for discrete portions
of a cleanup."12 A third type of mixed funding is the preauthorization
the EPA to give the PRPs special notice prior to cleanup. If the EPA receives a substantial good
faith offer within 60 days of the special notice, a 60-day negotiation period begins. A substantial
good faith offer must meet four criteria. It must be written, equal or exceed the combined allotted
shares of the PRPs making the offer, meet the majority of the cleanup costs, and must be accept-
able to the EPA in all other respects. If the EPA and the PRPs reach an agreement within the 60-
day negotiation period, a consent decree is entered. If no agreement results or the EPA receives no
offer at all, the EPA may compel the parties to clean up pursuant to CERCLA § 104. If the EPA
decides not to settle, it must notify the PRP of its reasons in writing. SARA requires that the
settling PRPs pay the expenses of preparing the NBAR if the EPA accepts their offer. See id. §
122(e)(3)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(D). If no settlement results, the NBAR's cost is added to the
total response cost. Id.
110. See id. § 122(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1); EPA Memorandum: Evaluating Mixed
Funding Settlements under CERCLA (Oct. 20, 1987), reprinted in 18 [Administrative Materials]
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,117 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter Mixed Funding Memorandum]. The
EPA approval of mixed funding is a two-part process. First the EPA determines whether a mixed
funding is appropriate using its 10 stated criteria:
1. Volume of wastes contributed to the site by each PRP
2. Nature of wastes contributed
3. Strength of evidence tracing the wastes at the site to the settling parties
4. Ability of the settling parties to pay
5. Litigation risks in proceeding to trial
6. Public interest considerations
7. Precedential value
8. Value of obtaining a present sum certain
9. Inequities and aggravating factors
10. Nature of the case that remains after settlement
EPA Memorandum: Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5037-38 (1985) [here-
inafter Interim Settlement Memorandum]. If a mixed funding settlement meets the above criteria,
the EPA considers which particular funding approach is optimal for the site in question. Id. at
5037.
111. See Mixed Funding Memorandum, supra note 110, at 35,119. In evaluating a cash-out
settlement, the EPA considers if the settlors will pay a substantial percentage of total costs, and
assesses the reliability of liability and cleanup estimates at the time of settlement. It also may
consider equitable factors related to both settling and nonsettling PRPs. The EPA generally will
not entertain cash-out settlements once a Superfund financed cleanup is underway. A recent exam-
ple of a cash-out approach is the settlement granted to de minimis generators at the Cannons
Engineering sites. See United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., CA 88-1786-WF (D. Mass. Aug. 3,
1988); see also supra note 97. The de minimis settling PRPs paid their volumetric percentages of
the EPA's past and future response costs, a settlement premium calculated by multiplying .60
times each PRP's volumetric share, and a base settlement charge designed to reimburse the EPA
for its negotiation transaction costs. See 53 Fed. Reg. 4070, 4071-72 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 20,165
(1988).
112. See Mixed Funding Memorandum, supra note 110, at 35,120. A mixed funding arrange-
ment is useful particularly when the cleanup will be undertaken in discrete phases. Id.; see also
supra notes 71, 72 and accompanying text. The EPA, however, will not approve mixed funding if it
could delay cleanup or if the planned actions are technically complex, such as mixed construction.
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partial settlement in which PRPs agree to clean up the site in exchange
for the right to make claims against Superfund for response costs, such
as orphan shares, that the EPA agrees to finance. 113  Thus,
preauthorized mixed funding offers the advantage of settlement for less
than one hundred percent of the total cleanup cost.
A third incentive for settlement is the release from present and fu-
ture liability to the government. 114 SARA issues such releases in the
form of covenants not to sue."15 The EPA may grant a covenant not to
sue if it will expedite cleanup and is within the "public interest."' "
Also, the settlor must fully comply with a consent decree issued pursu-
ant to section 106, and the EPA must approve the cleanup. 117 To be
See Mixed Funding Memorandum, supra note 110, at 35,120. Any releases or covenants not to sue
would be limited to the cleanup phases explicitly covered by the settlement agreement. Id.
113. See Mixed Funding Memorandum, supra note 110, at 35,118-19. Before granting a
preauthorized mixed funding settlement, the EPA considers the PRP's ability to clean up in a
timely manner, the PRP's percentage of cleanup, and the severity of the contamination. The EPA
limits preauthorization to remedial design and remedial action (RD/RA) proposals; it rarely grants
preauthorization for a removal or RI/FS action.
114. SARA provides that a covenant not to sue for future liability becomes effective only
upon the EPA's certification that the remedial action meets successfully the requirements specified
in the consent decree, and is therefore complete. See SARA, supra note 11, § 122(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. §
9622(f)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
115. See EPA Memorandum: Covenants Not to Sue Under SARA (July 10, 1987), 52 Fed.
Reg. 28,038 (1987), reprinted in 17 [Administrative Materials] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
35,060 (Sept. 1987).
116. See SARA, supra note 11, § 122(f)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(4) (Supp. IV 1986). An assess-
ment of public interest requires consideration of the following seven factors:
A. The effectiveness and reliability of the remedy, in light of the other alternative remedies
considered for the facility concerned.
B. The nature of the risks remaining at the facility.
C. The extent to which performance standards are included in the order or decree.
D. The extent to which the response action provides a complete remedy for the facility, in-
cluding a reduction in the hazardous nature of the substances at the facility.
E. The extent to which the technology used in the response action is demonstrated to be
effective.
F. Whether the Fund or other sources of funding would be available for any additional reme-
dial actions that might eventually be necessary at the facility.
G. Whether the remedial action will be carried out, in whole or in significant part, by the
responsible parties themselves.
Id. A federal court found that a settlement agreement, containing covenants not to sue, was in the
public interest because it resolved the cleanup of a PCB contaminated site that threatened con-
tamination of the Biscayne Aquifer, the primary source of drinking water for southeast Florida.
See United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1987). In contrast,
a covenant not to sue for criminal claims is never in the public interest.
117. SARA, supra note 11, § 122(f)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(4) (Supp. IV 1986). Other sections
of SARA that allow releases at the EPA's discretion include: § 122(f) (PRPs that fully comply with
§ 106 orders), § 122(g)(2) (de minimis settlors), and § 122(j)(2) (parties who agree to restore federal
resources). See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f), (g)(2), (j)(2) (Supp. IV. 1986). In addition to the discretionary
releases, SARA requires the EPA to grant a covenant not to sue if the wastes are destroyed perma-
nently or if the EPA disposes the wastes off-site rather than undertaking an on-site remedy.
SARA, supra note 11, § 122(f)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
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effective, the covenant not to sue must bind federal, state, and county
governments. 118 The one significant drawback of the release is the re-
quired reopener provision, a potential escape from the release for the
government. Only in "extraordinary circumstances" may the EPA waive
a reopener for future liability contingent upon conditions unknown at
the time of settlement119 and for inadequate remedial actions that en-
danger the public health and environment. 20
Section 122(g) of SARA also gives the small volume generator a
chance to settle. It requires the government, whenever practicable, to
settle with de minimis waste contributors when the settlement repre-
sents only a small fraction of the total cleanup costs estimated for the
site. 12 To qualify as a de minimis contributor, the PRP either must be
a small volume generator/transporter, whose volume and toxicity of
waste are minimal in comparison to the total amount and toxicity of
hazardous wastes at the site,'22 or a landowner, who neither allowed nor
contributed to the hazardous waste generation or disposal by action or
inaction, nor purchased the property with actual or constructive notice
of the existence of toxic wastes.123 In addition to protection from joint
and several liability in excess of their apportioned share, de minimis
settlors avoid potential transaction costs greater than their actual liabil-
ity.124 Like other settling parties, de minimis settlors have immunity
118. See, e.g., Pepper's Steel & Alloys, 658 F. Supp. at 1160; cf. United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (federal government suing parties who had obtained
releases from the state environmental agency).
119. SARA, supra note 11, § 122(f)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
120. See, e.g., Pepper's Steel & Alloys, 658 F. Supp. at 1168. The covenant not to sue stated:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Decree, the United States reserves the right
to institute a new action, or to seek modification of this Consent Decree if necessary to do so,
in order to compel FPL [Florida Power & Light Co.] either to take additional response mea-
sures at the site or to reimburse Plaintiff for additional cleanup costs if:
(1) there is a release or a substantial threat of a release of hazardous substances at or
from the Site which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public
health or welfare or the environment and which arises from previously unknown or unde-
tected conditions, and/or
(2) Plaintiff receives new information, concerning the nature of the substances at the Site
or appropriateness of past response actions which indicates that site conditions may present
an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment because of the release or threat of release of hazardous substances from the Site.
Id.
121. See SARA, supra note 11, § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (Supp. IV 1986); see also EPA
Memorandum: Interim Guidance on Settlements with De Minimis Waste Contributors Under
SARA § 122(g) (June 19, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 24,333 (1987) [hereinafter De Minimis Waste Con-
tributors Memorandum], reprinted in 17 [Administrative Materials] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 35,067 (Sept. 1987).
122. SARA, supra note 11, § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (Supp. IV 1986).
123. Id.
124. See De Minimis Waste, Contributors Memorandum, supra note 121, at 24,334, re-
printed in Envtl. L. Rep., supra note 122, at 35,067.
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from contribution suits brought by other PRPs.125
De minimis settlement, however, has several limitations. Instead of
determining fixed threshold levels and settlement terms, the EPA ap-
plies de minimis criteria on a site specific basis.126 A de minimis volume
of waste at one site may not be de minimis at another site. 2 7 The EPA
will not enter into settlement negotiations until after the investigatory
phase of site remediation because settlement requires sufficient infor-
mation concerning the identity and contribution activities of each de
minimis PRP.128 De minimis settlors also must assume a pro rata liabil-
ity for the orphan shares of defunct or insolvent parties.2 9 Finally, the
settlement agreement is not a binding release of liability; the EPA may
set it aside in the case of unanticipated cost overruns. 3 °
Even if some PRPs settle, the nonsettlors do not escape liability.
First, settling PRPs may bring contribution actions against nonsettling
PRPs.15' Second, if the settling PRPs paid less than their ultimate pro-
portionate share of liability, the EPA may assess the shortfall against
the nonsettlors
1 3 2
III. SECOND TIER RECOVERY-SPREADING THE LIABILITY AMONG OTHER
SECTION 107 POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
A PRP that bears more than its equitable share of cleanup costs
may bring private recovery actions against other PRPs liable under sec-
125. See EPA Memorandum: Interim Model CERCLA Section 122(g)(4) De Minimis Con-
tributor Consent Decree and Administrative Order on Consent, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,393, 43,394 (1987).
Section 13 of this model consent decree states that the EPA agrees that the de minimis settlor has
"resolved its liability to the United States for Covered Matters pursuant to ... 42 U.S.C.
9622(g)(5), and shall not be liable for claims for contribution for Covered Matters." Id. at 43,398.
126. See Ruhl, De Minimis Settlement Policy Leaves Small Volume Contributors Guessing,
3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1988, at 35.
127. Id. at 36. For instance, a 1% contributor is excluded from de minimis status if its waste
differs from the toxicity of the general waste composition or if a significant number of generators
also contribute only 1% of the waste. Early settlement with large numbers of de minimis contribu-
tors may disadvantage major contributors at the site. At the Cannons Engineering toxic waste
sites, more than 250 parties qualified as de minimis under the EPA's 1% ceiling. The ineligible
contributors argued that the ceiling was too high, allowing too small a settlement too early. See id.;
see also supra notes 97, 115.
128. See De Minimis Waste Contributors Memorandum, supra note 121, at 24,336, reprinted
in Envtl. L. Rep., supra note 121, at 35,068-69.
129. Id. at 24,338, reprinted in Envtl. L. Rep., supra note 121, at 35,070.
130. Id. at 24,337, reprinted in Envtl. L. Rep., supra note 121, at 35,069. The EPA must
include a reservation of rights clause unless it concludes that the site records account for the vast
majority of the waste and expects no significant new information about the site to surface. Id.
131. SARA, supra note 11, § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (Supp. IV. 1986); see infra note
147 and accompanying text; see also City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 681 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
132. SARA, supra note 11, § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
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tion 107.133 PRPs may recover costs "necessary" and "consistent" with
the NCP. T'3 If the PRP voluntarily cleaned up the site prior to govern-
mental action, it may recover under section 107(a)(4)(B). Before SARA,
courts disagreed whether private party complaints must allege and
prove EPA approval of the response action. 13 5 After SARA, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that neither prior federal, state, or local government ac-
tion concerning a site,3 6 nor cleanup pursuant to a governmentally au-
thorized cleanup program,137 are prerequisites to a private party's
action for response costs under section 107 because Congress intended
to promote private enforcement actions.
A. Contribution Suits Against Nongovernmental PRPs
Prior to the SARA amendments, the majority of courts recognized
an implicit right to contribution but did not define the standards for
dividing costs. 3 8 In United States v. New Castle Co.'39 the court listed
the criteria for a third-party complaint for contribution under CER-
CLA: The third-party defendant disposed of waste at the site; the waste
contained "hazardous substances;"'"4 and those particular chemicals
were identified at the site.' Moreover, the third-party plaintiff was not
133. See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 64, pt. 3, at 19, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3042.
134. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The burden of proving consistency with the
NCP lies with the plaintiff PRP. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
579 F. Supp. 823, 850-51 (W.D. Mo. 1984), af'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 146 (1987). Consistency is measured solely against the NCP in effect at the time the actual
response costs were incurred, not when the cleanup action began or ended. See id. at 851.
Private plaintiffs must prepare the most cost-effective practicable response plan, must provide
an opportunity for public comment, must use EPA-approved contractors, and must comply with
any governmental agency's requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 300.71 (1988). A cost-effective alternative
must meet a minimum level of environmental protection. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1988).
135. Compare Artesian Water Co. v. Government of Newcastle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348
(D. Del. 1985) (requiring prior government approval), aff'd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.
1988) with Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (not requiring federal preauthorization of private recovery action).
136. See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1988).
137. See Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating
that it is "'absolutely clear that no Federal approval of any kind is a prerequisite to a cost recov-
ery under section 107'" (quoting National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.71 (1988))).
138. See Garber, Federal Common Law of Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amend-
ments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365 (1987). Most courts found a right to contribution implicit in CERCLA
or alternatively within the courts' power to create federal common law. Id.
139. 642 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Del. 1986).
140. See CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982); see also New Castle,
642 F. Supp. at 1274 n.5 (noting that the presence of more than a regulatory threshold concentra-
tion of a pollutant, not the mere presence of a pollutant, triggers CERCLA liability).
141. New Castle, 642 F. Supp. at 1275 (not requiring complainant to allege any threshold
amount of waste because the purpose of discovery is to allow the parties to substantiate their
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restricted to contribution from only persons responsible for the specific
chemical species listed as hazardous substances in the government's
complaint.1 42 The courts agreed that nonculpable PRPs could sue other
PRPs to recover costs, but the question of whether culpable parties also
had standing to sue was uncertain. 143 CERCLA created no statute of
limitations for cost recovery actions 4 and the majority of courts have
reasoned that because CERCLA was equitable in nature, the doctrine
of laches applied, rather than a statute of limitations. 45
SARA provides expressly that if the government holds the PRP lia-
ble under section 106 or 107, the PRP may seek contribution from
other PRPs pursuant to section 113(f). In addition, PRPs that settle
with the government may seek contribution from nonsettlor PRPs.'"
Under SARA, the right to seek contribution is retroactive 47 and with-
out qualification. Even culpable parties, therefore, may recover costs
from other PRPs. 45 SARA states that "any person may seek contribu-
tion from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under sec-
tion 9607(a) . .. ,,149This amendment codifies the federal common-law
principle that contribution may be obtained only from parties indepen-
dently liable under CERCLA. 50 Therefore, the threshold issue in any
claims).
142. Id.
143. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1057-58 (D. Ariz. 1984)
(allowing former owner/operator's equitable defense of unclean hands to bar the present owner!
operator's recovery), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
144. See, e.g., T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 704 (D.N.J. 1988).
145. E.g., United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985).
146. SARA, supra note 11, § 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1986), states:
"A person who has resolved its liability to the United States ... for some or all of the costs of
such [response] action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribu-
tion from any person who is not a party to a settlement."
147. SARA's contribution provision is retroactive because Congress merely codified the con-
tribution right that already existed. See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 64, pt. 1, at 79, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws at 2861.
148. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1003 (D.N.J. 1988);
Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
149. SARA, supra note 11, § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). This section
states:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially
liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under section
9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims ... shall be governed by
Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in
this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in
the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.
Id.
150. E.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Corp., 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill.)
(disallowing contribution suit against chemical manufacturers because they were not liable parties
under § 107 as they neither generated or transported wastes nor owned or operated a waste site),
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contribution action is whether the contribution defendant is a responsi-
ble party under CERCLA section 107.
The PRP will remain liable for all costs less the defendant's allo-
cated share. The burden of apportionment will be on the PRP, but un-
like liability actions against the government, courts are free to consider
equitable factors when allocating the amount of contribution between
liable parties.151 The legislative history of CERCLA states that a court
may consider "the degree of involvement by parties in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous sub-
stances.' 1 52 A 1988 federal district court decision indicated that equita-
ble factors between a former owner and the current owner of the
manufacturing facility would include the amount by which the sale
price was discounted, and the damage caused by the current owner af-
ter the closing date.' Similarly, a Minnesota court relied on equitable
factors when it apportioned cleanup costs between generators and own-
ers and operators.'5 The court assessed the majority of the cleanup
costs to the owners and operators because they exercised control over
the treatment and storage of the hazardous substances, took no action
to reduce their toxicity, substantially caused their release, and failed to
cooperate with the government's cleanup.155 In addition to their aware-
ness of the hazardous character of the wastes, the owners and operators
were expert toxic waste handlers.5 e In contrast, the generators cooper-
ated fully with the government and relied on the owners' and operators'
representations that the waste would be disposed of properly. 57
The range of defenses to contribution suits is not limited to those
listed in section 107(b) defenses. 5 8 Other permissible defenses include
previous settlement with the government, 59 and an enforceable indem-
aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988); accord C. Greene Equip. Corp. v. Electron Corp., 697 F. Supp.
983 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that a seller of totally enclosed, nonleaking PCB transformer is not a
responsible party under CERCLA).
151. See supra notes 77, 78, and accompanying text; see also Allied Corp., 691 F. Supp. at
1118 n.12 (applying the Gore factors in allocating costs in second tier contribution suits but not in
first tier suits involving the Government as plaintiff).
152. H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 64, pt. 3, at 19, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3042.
153. Southland Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 1003.
154. See Advance Circuits, Inc. v. Carriere Properties, Nos. 84-3316, 84-4591 (D. Minn. Feb.
18, 1987); see also Dubuc & Evans, supra note 3, at 10,201.
155. Advance Circuits, Nos. 84-3316, 84-4591.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989).
159. See SARA, supra note 11, § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) (stating
that a party that has settled with the government is not liable for contribution).
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nification agreement between the indemnifier plaintiff and defendant. 160
Caveat emptor, however, is no defense to contribution and may not be
used to transfer CERCLA liability to a purchaser.' 61 SARA created a
three year statute of limitations for contribution suits,"6 2 which begins
to run on the date of judgment, date of administrative order, 63 or date
of entry of a judicially approved settlement. One 1988 district court de-
cision reasoned that because SARA created a statute of limitations for
contribution suits where none previously existed, the period began to
run for existing claims on the effective date of SARA, October 17,
1986.164 Therefore, a rush of contribution suits resulting from pre-
SARA judgments or settlements is now before the courts in anticipation
of the October 1989 deadline.
B. Suits Against the Government for Contribution and Indemnity
In United States v. Moore"6 5 the court addressed the issue of
whether a PRP could seek indemnity and contribution from a federal
agency. The Department of Defense (DOD) sold Moore certain cylin-
ders that allegedly caused environmental damage. 6 After settling with
the EPA, Moore filed a contribution suit against the DOD. The court
allowed Moore's claim for contribution on a recoupment theory.'16 The
court also allowed the indemnity claim, noting that Congress envisioned
indemnification as a means of shifting the financial burden of cleanups
to responsible parties, which may include government agencies.6 " Like-
wise, in 1988 the Ninth Circuit indicated that the federal government, a
previous owner of the hazardous waste site, could be liable as a defend-
ant in a cost recovery action brought by a private plaintiff under section
107.169 During its period of ownership, the government built a rubber
plant on the site, leased it to a third party to operate, and approved the
third party's disposal of hazardous byproducts at the site. 17 0
160. See id. § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e).
161. See Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d at 89-90.
162. SARA, supra note 11, § 113(g)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
163. SARA provides for "administrative order[s] under section 9622(g) . . . (relating to de
minimis settlements) or 9622(h) . . (relating to cost recovery settlements)." Id. § 113(g)(3)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B).
164. See T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 704 (D.N.J. 1988).
165. United States v. Moore, No. 87-101-NN, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1153 (E.D. Va. July 27,
1988) (denying various motions by the United States and the defendants); United States v. Moore,
No. 87-101-NN, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1151 (E.D. Va. May 27, 1988).
166. Moore, 28 Env't Rep. at 1153.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 695-96 (9th Cir. 1988) (re-
manding damages claim against the federal government for further consideration).
170. Id. at 693.
1492 [Vol. 42:1469
CERCLA CLEANUP
Unless the EPA's settlement agreement contains reciprocal cove-
nants not to sue, the settling PRP may be able to sue other governmen-
tal entities or even one of the governmental parties in the consent
decree. In United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp.'7' more than 200
PRPs paid a pro rata sum to settle with the United States based on
each PRP's proportionate share'72 of waste sent to the Seymour site. In
return, the PRPs received covenants not to sue signed by the United
States, the State, the City, and the local aviation board. The Seymour
Recycling Consent Decree and the Pro Rata Covenants not to sue con-
tained reciprocal covenants protecting only the federal and state gov-
ernments from suit. The court allowed the settling PRPs to file
contribution claims against the City and its aviation board, the owners
of the site. 173
IV. THIRD TIER RECOVERY-SPREADING LIABILITY TO POTENTIALLY
LIABLE PARTIES BEYOND SECTION 107
If the PRP anticipates shouldering a disproportionate share of the
cleanup costs due to the missing shares of defunct, insolvent, or judg-
ment-proof PRPs, it must look beyond the scope of section 107 PRPs.
Other potential defendants include indemnifiers, successor corpora-
tions, parent corporations, individual shareholders, and corporate
officers.
A. Contractual Transfers of Liability
All responsible persons are fully liable to the government for
cleanup costs under CERCLA regardless of any contractual agreements
to which they are a party.174 CERCLA allows contractual transfers of
response costs; section 107(e)(1) recognizes expressly contracts to en-
sure, hold harmless, or indemnify between private parties.'7 Although
these agreements do not alter or excuse the underlying liability, they
provide a right to reimbursement or compensation to the party held
liable under section 107(a).76 Therefore, the PRP should consider care-
fully any agreements to which it is a party, whether express or implied,
that transfer contractually its liability to a third party. The same con-
tract that precludes a PRP from asserting an affirmative section 107(b)
171. 686 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
172. See supra note 68.
173. See Seymour Recycling, 686 F. Supp. at 699. The court found that the settlement
neither contractually nor statutorily barred Seymour Recycling's claim against the City and the
aviation board. Id.
174. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1982).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
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defense to liability against the government may provide the PRP with a
valid cause of action against the third party with whom it contracted
for recovery of the response costs the PRP paid the government.
A successful contractual transfer of liability action offers several
advantages over a contribution action. Instead of pursuing costly PRP
searches or bringing multiple suits against numerous contribution de-
fendants, the plaintiff PRP may obtain a full recovery from a single
indemnifier defendant. A successful indemnity action can shift the en-
tire cost of cleanup from the plaintiff PRP to another party rather than
merely reducing the plaintiff PRP's cost burden by a percentage equal
to the defendant's liability. The indemnifier defendant need not qualify
as a PRP under section 107.177 Therefore, the same party that success-
fully avoids liability with the government by asserting a valid innocent
landowner defense may bear the entire cost of CERCLA cleanup if it
contractually assumed the responsibility for environmental hazards
within the purchase agreement. Last, previous settlement with the gov-
ernment offers no protection from indemnification suits. A PRP may
bring indemnification actions against both settling and nonsettling
parties.
Parties to an agreement containing an indemnity or warranty pro-
vision typically have conflicting goals. A current owner (buyer) of a haz-
ardous waste site may bring suit against the predecessor owner (seller)
on the basis of an indemnity or warranty clause contained within the
purchase and sale contract. At the time of closing, the seller wishes to
disclaim all warranties and release all environmental risks to the buyer,
whereas the buyer desires protection from all future liabilities. Simi-
larly, a hazardous waste generator wishes to transfer the risk of envi-
ronmental liability to the transporter and owner/operator of a disposal
site. In contrast, the transporter and owner/operator request indemnifi-
cation or a release from the generator. Therefore, the issue of whether
CERCLA liability is transferred becomes one of contract interpreta-
tion. e17 Courts look to the language of the contract to discern the par-
ties' mutual objective intent at the time they entered into the
agreement.7M The majority of decisions agree that state law governs
contract interpretation and the validity of causes of action for contrac-
177. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
The Hines Lumber court stated that CERCLA does not impose liability on "slipshod architects,
clumsy engineers, poor construction contractors,. . . negligent suppliers of on-the-job training," or
even a party who is "all four rolled into one" absent a contractual agreement to indemnify. Id. at
157.
178. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000-01 (D.N.J. 1988).
179. Id.
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tual cost recovery i s°
Courts disagree on whether a valid contractual transfer of CER-
CLA liability must be express. One federal district court declined to
recognize an implied warranty in a typical waste disposal contract be-
tween a generator and owner/operator.181 Other courts have upheld im-
plied contractual transfers of liability if not contrary to the intent of
the parties. 82 For example, one federal district court interpreted a 1967
release from "all claims, demands, and causes of action which plaintiff
has, had, or may have.. ." to include any future CERCLA claims, even
without an express reference to CERCLA. 8s Likewise, in upholding
language discharging general claims "based upon, arising out of or in
any way relating to the Purchase Agreement" as a valid release of the
seller from a CERCLA claim, the Ninth Circuit noted that the parties
had constructive notice of CERCLA, their negotiations encompassed
environmental liabilities, and the seller paid separate consideration for
"other claims asserted under the Purchase Agreement. ' '1 8'
A valid release may bar or reduce the PRP plaintiff's recovery. For
example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a postclosing release of CERCLA
liability.18 5 The buyer argued that because the parties were unaware of
the impending cleanup and future closure of the waste disposal site at
the time of agreement, the release should be avoided.' The applicable
180. See Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1460; Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Management,
Inc., 690 F. Supp. 1409, 1417 (E.D. Pa. 1988); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp.
1285, 1291 (D. Minn. 1987). But see Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1463 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(arguing against state law presumption because CERCLA is federal law). Because state law gov-
erns contractual transfers of liability, it is necessary to look to the relevant state indemnity and
warranty law. For instance, some states bar indemnity claims among joint tortfeasors. See Mardan
Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 n.5 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd on other grounds,
804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
181. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285,
1295 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (rationalizing its nonrecognition of implied warranties by stating that "[i]f
owner/operators and generators wish to redistribute the risks distributed by Congress, they must
do so clearly and unequivocally").
182. See, e.g., Lyncott Corp., 690 F. Supp. at 1416 (recognizing implied indemnity under
CERCLA if it would not defeat the intention of the parties to the agreement).
183. See FMC Corp., 668 F. Supp. at 1292.
184. Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1456; cf. id. at 1463 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
that a general release includes CERCLA claims and recommending adoption of a uniform federal
rule requiring a release of a CtRCLA claim to be express).
185. Id. at 1456. The buyer, Mardan Corp., acquired a manufacturing plant from the seller in
1980. Id. The next year, the parties entered into an agreement pursuant to which the seller paid
Mardan $781,055 as settlement for "'other claims asserted under the Purchase Agreement.'" Id.
(quoting the parties' settlement agreement). In return, Mardan agreed to release the seller from
"'all actions, causes of action, suits,. . . based upon, arising out of or in any way relating to the
Purchase Agreement."' Id. (quoting the parties' settlement agreement). In 1983 the EPA brought
an action against Mardan. Mardan then sued the seller under CERCLA § 107 to recover cleanup
costs estimated at between $500,000 and $1,550,000. Id.
186. Id. at 1462.
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state law would avoid the release if the parties believed mistakenly that
no injury existed, but not if the parties knew of the injury but not the
extent of its consequences.8 7 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument
because both parties knew that the environmental problems and haz-
ardous wastes located at the site would require future corrective actions
and that the buyer had constructive knowledge of CERCLA. 1'8 In con-
trast, a warranty disclaimer is a defense limited to causes of action
based on breach of warranty; it is not an express assumption of liabil-
ity.189 A typical purchase and sale agreement will contain a warranty
disclaimer similar to the following:
THE ASSETS ARE SOLD ON AN "AS IS, WHERE IS" BASIS WITHOUT
WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE AS TO QUALITY, CHARACTER, PERFORM-
ANCE, OR CONDITION, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WAR-
RANTY OR GUARANTEE OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE.190
This typical warranty will not transfer all environmental liabilities to
the buyer.
By interpreting narrowly other techniques used by the indemnify-
ing party to limit its liability exposure, such as excepting various situa-
tions or imposing conditions on indemnification, courts favor PRP
plaintiff recovery from the indemnifier.1 91 One example is the typical
change of law provision included in most contracts to transfer all risks
of change of law from the indemnifier. Arguably, this provision provides
a defense in contracts entered into before 1980;'9 courts will impose
constructive notice of CERCLA on contracts entered into after the en-
actment of CERCLA. 93
Another exposure limitation technique that sellers use excepts lia-
bility for postclosing incidents caused in whole or in part by the buyer.
In a recent example, a buyer purchased the assets of the seller's gear
making business in 1974 and continued production. In the purchase
agreement, the seller promised to indemnify the buyer with respect to
"[a]ny and all liabilities of Seller of any nature, whether absolute, ac-
crued, contingent or otherwise, existing at the Closing Date or arising
out of any transaction of the Seller ... prior to the Closing
Date .... After the state environmental agency ordered the buyer
187. Id. (applying New York law).
188. Id. at 1463.
189. Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (D.N.J. 1988).
190. Id.
191. See generally Zimmerman, Environmental Issues in Sales Transactions: The Seller's
Perspective, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1988, at 7.
192. See FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Minn. 1987).
193. See Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1461-63 (barring a release entered into in 1981).
194. Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 822 F. 2d 31, 33 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987).
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to undertake remedial cleanup actions in 1985, the seller argued that its
contractual promise of twelve years earlier did not include an assump-
tion of liability for future unanticipated events. The Seventh Circuit
held that although the contract language appeared unambiguous, boil-
erplate indemnity conditions did not bar the plaintiff's recovery against
the indemnifier if parol and extrinsic evidence showed that environ-
mental liabilities were not within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of sale. 19 5
The indemnifier also may attempt to limit its obligation to specific
tasks or impose a monetary ceiling.19 6 This strategy failed in Emhart
Industries, Inc. v. Duracell International, Inc.1 7 In addition to the ex-
penses of the specifically agreed upon tasks of removing PCB contami-
nated materials and residues from the facility, the federal district court
held defendant Duracell liable for attorney's fees, lost profits, and ex-
penses for the shutdown of the facility in the period prior to the initia-
tion of a cleanup plan.198 The district court reasoned that because
Emhart's losses from shutting down the facility were "incurred under or
imposed by law," they were compensable by indemnifier Duracell.'99
Another technique imposes a time restriction on the indemnity ob-
ligation. This strategy did not limit the seller's liability in Southland
Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc.20 0 The purchase and sale agreement included
both an indemnity clause and the following two-year survival provision:
"All of the representations, warranties, promises and agreements of the
parties set forth in this Agreement shall survive the Closing for a period
of two (2) years . . . regardless of what investigations the parties may
have made before the Closing."'2 0' Ashland claimed that the parties in-
tended to transfer all hazardous substance liabilities to Southland two
years after closing. The Southland court disagreed and held that this
provision barred only breach of contract claims based on indemnity; it
was not an express assumption of liability by Southland.0 2
B. Successor Liability
The Third Circuit applied the doctrine of corporate successor lia-
bility in several recent suits for contribution for site cleanup costs. In
195. Id. at 35.
196. Id.
197. 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
198. Id. at 562, 570. Emhart shut down the facility temporarily, fearing it could be subject to
criminal liability under the Toxic Substances Control Act.
199. Id. at 571. Duracell was not held responsible for Emhart's decision to close the facility
and buy another plant because that would be an expansion of the indemnity beyond its terms. Id.
200. 696 F. Supp. 994, 1001-02 (D.N.J. 1988).
201. Id. at 1001 n.8.
202. Id. at 1001-02.
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United States v. Union Gas Co.203 predecessors of Union Gas owned
and operated a facility that released hazardous substances. Years after
the facility had been abandoned and dismantled, both the federal and
state governments sued successor Union Gas for cleanup costs.2 °0 In
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.20 5 the Third Cir-
cuit reasoned that although CERCLA does not explicitly address corpo-
rate successor liability, it is a concept compatible with CERCLA's
policy of funding cleanup by responsible parties.20 6 The defendants'
predecessor corporation sold asbestos contaminated property to Smith
Land in 1963. The defendants claimed no liability because they never
owned or operated the facility; the corporate merger occurred four years
after the transfer of property.20 7 The Third Circuit held that a successor
corporation should bear the costs of cleanup rather than the taxpayers
because the original corporation, its successors, and their stockholders
realized savings from the failure to use nonhazardous means of disposal
while the public realized only indirect benefits, if any at all.20 8 There-
fore, a corporation cannot escape a potentially large liability merely by
sale to or merger with an innocent third party.
C. Liability Beyond the Corporate Entity
Generally, the corporate entity is the party held liable for CERCLA
cleanup costs.20 9 Traditionally, the corporate form could be disregarded
only by using federal or state common-law principles such as piercing
the corporate veil, which extend the liability of a corporation beyond its
assets to hold the parent corporation or individual corporate officers
and shareholders personally liable for its CERCLA debts. Courts im-
pose CERCLA liability beyond a corporate entity either derivatively by
piercing the corporate veil or directly by expanding the statutory lan-
guage of CERCLA section 107(a) to reach corporate officers and
shareholders. 10
1. Parent Corporation Liability
CERCLA does not address parent company liability explicitly. Par-
ent corporations have at least nominal control over the activities of
203. 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
204. Id.
205. 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989).
206. Id. at 91-92.
207. Id. at 88, 90.
208. Id. at 92.
209. See, e.g., McMahon & Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrines in




their subsidiaries because they are usually the majority or sole share-
holder of their subsidiaries. The doctrine of limited liability protects
parent companies as shareholders from liability stemming from their
subsidiaries' actions unless a court pierces the corporate veil. Courts are
reluctant to pierce the corporate form absent fraud or a finding that the
corporation is not a separate entity from its parent. In the 1985 decision
of Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness"' the federal district court declined
to pierce the corporate veil. The hazardous waste site owner, Agribusi-
ness, was a subsidiary of Syntex U.S.A., which in turn was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Syntex Corporation. Although Syntex Corporation
participated in the management of Agribusiness to the normal extent of
a parent's interest in its subsidiary, the court declined to assert jurisdic-
tion over the parent corporation on the ground that Agribusiness was a
separate corporate entity.212 Likewise, in In re Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor Proceedings213 the federal district court held that a
parent corporation of a "well capitalized, non-fraudulent, separate cor-
porate subsidiary" that is the current owner of a hazardous waste site is
not liable under traditional principles of corporate law. 14 The court
also declined to analyze liability under section 107 because it found that
limited liability was still the rule despite the important policies behind
CERCLA.215 More recently, another federal district court refused to
hold the parent corporation liable unless the parent's control exceeded
active participation in management and amounted to total domination
of the subsidiary such that the subsidiary ceased to function as a sepa-
rate entity.216 Therefore, the majority of the case law supports limited
corporate liability and the nonliability of a parent corporation.
The 1986 district court decision of Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co.217 rep-
211. 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
212. Id. at 30. The Wehner court listed five factors that may destroy the presumption of
corporate separateness:
"(a) The business transactions, property, employees, bank and other accounts and
records of the corporations are intermingled;
(b) The formalities of separate corporate procedures for each corporation are not ob-
served...;
(c) The corporation is inadequately financed as a separate unit...
(d) The respective enterprises are not held out to the public as separate enterprises;
(e) The policies of the corporation are not directed to its own interests primarily but
rather to those of the other corporation."
Id. (quoting H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 148, at 355-56 (1983)).
213. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
214. Id. at 32.
215. Id.
216. Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 227, 230 n.19 (W.D. La. 1988)
(citing the Fifth Circuit's "laundry list" of factors to consider when evaluating the degree of con-
trol a parent exercises over its subsidiary).
217. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
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resents the minority position. The decision imposed liability on the par-
ent corporation as the owner or operator under section 107(a)(2). The
court compared the subsidiary's capital of eleven hundred dollars to the
twenty-seven million dollars in dividends the parent received from the
subsidiary's facility. Also, the parent as the sole stockholder had the
authority to control hazardous waste disposal and releases and to im-
plement actions to "prevent and abate the damage"; the subsidiary
could not spend more than five hundred dollars on pollution control
without the parent's approval. Bunker Hill's test for determining
whether the parent becomes liable under CERCLA as an owner or oper-
ator considers whether the parent has the capacity to discover hazard-
ous waste discharge, the authority to control the activities of the
subsidiary including the discharge of hazardous wastes, and the capac-
ity to prevent and abate the damage.21 s
2. Liability of Corporate Officers and Individual Shareholders
Corporate officers and shareholders qualify as persons219 and may
be liable individually under section 107 if they are current owners or
operators of facilities, past owners or operators at the time of disposal,
generators, or transporters that selected the disposal sites of hazardous
substances. The EPA will pursue solvent individuals to recover cleanup
costs if the liable corporation becomes insolvent, especially if the indi-
vidual is a corporate officer.220
In 1986 the Eighth Circuit first ruled that an individual share-
holder could be liable under the statutory language of CERCLA with-
out piercing the corporate veil.221 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that to
impose liability only on the corporate form and not on the individual
corporate officers who made the corporate decisions concerning the han-
dling and disposal of the toxic substances would "open an enormous
and clearly unintended loophole" in CERCLA.222 The court emphasized
that the authority to control the handling and disposal of hazardous
wastes is critical, rather than actual physical control or possession.223
Likewise, a federal district court held the president and sole share-
holder of a metal electroplating business liable as an "operator" under
218. Id. at 672.
219. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982).
220. See EPA Memorandum: Guidance Memorandum Regarding CERCLA Enforcement
Against Bankrupt Parties 4 (May 24, 1984).
221. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).




section 107 in United States v. Northernaire Plating Co.224 The court
noted that the officer supervised personally the daily operation of the
company including the disposal of hazardous wastes.22 5
In 1985 the Second Circuit found a corporate officer and share-
holder liable as an "operator" under section 107(a) in New York v.
Shore Realty Corp.226 Although neither the corporate officer nor his
company generated or transported any of the approximately 700,000
gallons of hazardous substances found on the Shore site, the officer
knew of the existence of the hazardous wastes and formed Shore Realty
solely for the purpose of purchasing the Shore site in an attempt to
limit his personal liability.227 The Second Circuit declined to pierce the
corporate veil absent a showing of fraud or of using the business for
personal as opposed to corporate interests and instead found direct lia-
bility under CERCLA.22 s
In sum, courts are likely to disregard the corporate form and find
individual shareholders and corporate officers liable personally for the
CERCLA debts of a corporation. 229 The two key elements to personal
liability under section 107 are ownership of the corporation coupled
with active participation in its management and the authority to con-
trol its daily actions with respect to hazardous substances. Courts are
less likely to pierce the corporate veil and find parent corporations lia-
ble for the debts of their subsidiaries absent fraud or a gross lack of
compliance with corporate formalities.
D. Bankrupt PRPs
The major stumbling block to spreading the costs of CERCLA lia-
bility is the possibility that even if a PRP is victorious against a de-
fendant for cleanup costs, the defendant may escape liability by seeking
refuge in bankruptcy. The corporate debtor need not be insolvent
before filing for bankruptcy, and it need not relinquish possession and
control of its business during reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code..23  The filing of the bankruptcy petition stays most
224. 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
225. Id. at 747.
226. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
227. Id. at 1037.
228. Id. at 1052.
229. See supra notes 221-28 and accompanying text. But see Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James &
Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988).
230. The Bankruptcy Code comprises Title 11 of the United States Code, enacted as Title I
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 151,326 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984), amended the
Bankruptcy Code and provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code relating to bankruptcy
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actions against the debtor including the enforcement of prepetition
judgments, pending lawsuits, any exercise of control over the property
of the estate, and collection of prepetition claims.2"' Upon the confirma-
tion of debtor's reorganization plan, the debtor is discharged from debts
arising before the date of confirmation.23 2
When a PRP with CERCLA cleanup obligations files a petition in
bankruptcy, the competing national policies of the Bankruptcy Code
and CERCLA clash. The goals of CERCLA, the prompt cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites and the payment of cleanup by those parties respon-
sible for the waste,233 conflict with the Bankruptcy Code's goals of
giving debtors a fresh start by discharging their liabilities and distribut-
ing the cash value of the debtor's estate to creditors.3 4 Additionally,
due to the focus on rapid cleanup, Congress directed that CERCLA
cleanup costs not be allocated until after the EPA investigates a site,
decides what remedial measures are necessary, and determines which
PRPs will bear the costs. 23 5 In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code permits
the bankruptcy court to estimate contingent liabilities. This mechanism
permits creditors to share in the assets of the estate before the liabili-
ties have matured.3 6 When conflicts between the Bankruptcy Code and
other federal laws such as CERCLA reach the "substantial and mate-
rial" threshold, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
jurisdiction. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code defines the rights, powers, and duties of the
debtor in possession. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). A trustee is appointed only for
cause under Chapter 11. See id. § 1104.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The automatic stay is subject to the excep-
tions listed in id. § 362(b). See infra note 256.
232. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1982); cf. id. § 1141(d)(3). Confirmation of a plan does not dis-
charge a debtor if the plan will liquidate all of the property of the estate, the debtor's business is
no longer a going concern after the plan is adopted, and the debtor would not meet the criteria for
a liquidation discharge under § 727. Id. A nonindividual debtor filing a petition for Chapter 7
liquidation does not receive a discharge; all that remains after liquidation is a corporate shell
empty of all assets. See id. § 522(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (denying nonindividual debtor exemp-
tions from property of the estate); id. § 541(a)(6) (Supp. V 1987) (allowing only individual debtors
to retain postpetition income).
An individual Chapter 7 debtor may not receive a discharge for environmental violations re-
sulting in debts not specifically excepted by § 523. For example, debts "for willful and malicious
injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity" are excepted. Id. §
523(a)(6) (1982). Therefore, if after a timely request, followed by notice and a hearing, there is
proof that an individual PRP intentionally disposed of toxic waste improperly with an actual in-
tent to do harm or, in some courts, implied or constructive malice, the PRP will not be granted a
discharge on its environmental liabilities. See id. § 523(c) (Supp. V 1987). A request made within
60 days of filing is timely. BANK,. R. 4007(c) (1988).
233. See, e.g., In re Combustion Equip. Assoc's., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988).
234. See id.
235. See Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
236. See Combustion Equip., 838 F.2d at 37.
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Act of 198437 authorizes the withdrawal of a case from a bankruptcy
court to a federal court of general jurisdiction.238 Withdrawal from the
bankruptcy court to the "more balanced, or neutral, adjudicatory envi-
ronment of the district court" would tend to benefit the party asserting
CERCLA response interests in the debtor's estate.23 9
The law remains uncertain concerning when a claim arises in the
context of bankruptcy.240 Whether CERCLA liability becomes a claim
in stages as the EPA incurs costs or whether it accrues as a whole at
some point between the deposit of toxic wastes and the final cleanup
will result in different outcomes in bankruptcy.2 ' If the claim arises at
the time a person generates, transports, or disposes of hazardous
wastes, the person could make a preemptive strike and discharge its
CERCLA liability in bankruptcy even before the EPA or a private
party begins cleanup. 42 The EPA's position is that the claim does not
arise until the party does the work for which it seeks reimbursement.243
237. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, tit. I, subtit. C, Pub. L.
No. 99-554, §§ 143, 144(b), 100 Stat. 3096 (1986) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (Supp. V 1987)).
Section 157(d) reflects Congress's intent that bankruptcy courts should be limited in their control
of matters outside the scope of bankruptcy. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 3.01, at 3-53 (15th ed.
1986).
238. In cases meeting the "substantial and material consideration" test, withdrawal is
mandatory rather than discretionary. The "substantial and material" threshold, however, is not
defined. A CERCLA plaintiff will prefer the district court forum while the defendant debtor will
prefer to have all proceedings affecting its ultimate discharge resolved by the bankruptcy court.
See AT&T Co. v. Chateaugay Corp., 88 Bankr. 581, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (allowing a private
party plaintiff to remove its case against a debtor to district court to resolve the issue of when its
right to contribution under § 113(f) of CERCLA arose); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 63 Bankr. 600,
602 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that Congress intended mandatory withdrawal for issues re-
quiring interpretation of CERCLA).
239. See Chateaugay Corp., 88 Bankr. at 584.
240. Section 101(4) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliq-
uidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, se-
cured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a
right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). Congress intended that "claim" be given "the broadest possible defini-
tion . . . [to] permit[] the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court." H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6266; S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5808.
The Bankruptcy Code determines explicitly when a right to payment arises while courts disagree
on the issue. See In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that absent an
overriding federal law, state law determines when a right to payment arises), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1160 (1985). But see In re Baldwin-United Corp., 765 F.2d 343, 348 n.4 (2d Cir. 1985) (declining to
follow Frenville).
241. The confirmation of a reorganization plan in Chapter 11 discharges the debtor only from
§ 101(4) claims arising before the date of confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (1982).
242. See, e.g., Johns-Manville, 63 Bankr. at 602.
243. See id.
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In 1988 the EPA estimated that it had 10,000 outstanding letters noti-
fying parties of their potential CERCLA liability. 4 Arguably, if the
CERCLA claim accrues upon receipt of the PRP letter, these 10,000
PRPs could receive a discharge of CERCLA liability by including an
estimate of their potential liability in their bankruptcy schedule of
claims.
The Second Circuit recently refused to grant a debtor a declaratory
judgment on the issue of whether the debtor's discharge of two years
earlier included its potential CERCLA liability arising from its landfill
sites.245 At the time of discharge, the PRPs had received notice of the
presence of the hazardous wastes; the EPA had neither initiated action
against the debtor or any other PRP nor decided if a cleanup action
would be necessary. 46 The debtor did not include its potential CER-
CLA liability in its schedule of claims for the confirmation of its Chap-
ter 11 plan.2 47 The Second Circuit noted that a discharge of CERCLA
liability may depend ultimately on whether the EPA requires the PRP
to perform the cleanup pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA or if the
EPA undertakes the cleanup and later sues the PRP for reimbursement
under section 107 of CERCLA.24 s
The plaintiff also may assert an administrative expense priority4 9
for cleanup costs incurred prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition if
the cleanup monies are necessary for the preservation of the estate.250
Because toxic waste contaminated property may have little or no value
prior to cleanup, many CERCLA response costs would meet this crite-
rion."' In 1987 the Sixth Circuit ruled that expenditures made to com-
244. See In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988).
245. See id. at 36. Combustion Equipment filed a voluntary petition in 1980 for reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. In 1981 its subsidiary closed two landfill sites
and filed a petition for liquidation under Chapter 7. Id. The EPA notified the subsidiary of its
PRP status for the cleanup of the landfill sites in the fall of 1983. Id. Upon the confirmation of
Combustion Equipment's reorganization plan in December 1983, those claims arising before the
date of confirmation received a discharge pursuant to § 1141(d)(1). See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)
(1982). The EPA filed a claim for administrative expenses in 1986 against the subsidiary. Combus-
tion Equip., 838 F.2d at 36. Combustion Equipment's reorganized successor sought a declaration
that its 1983 discharge included any liability for its subsidiary's CERCLA debts. Id.
246. Id. The PRP letter did not impose liability on the debtor. Rather, it stated that the
debtor "may be liable for money expended" and "may have responsibility for undertaking reme-
dial actions at the site." Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
247. Id. at 36; see also Chateaugay Corp., 88 Bankr. at 586 (stating that "[a] debtor cannot
hide behind confirmation of its plan to escape from liabilities that do not exist prior to
confirmation").
248. See Combustion Equip., 838 F.2d at 39.
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
250. This administrative expense priority is allowed for "the actual, necessary costs and ex-
penses of preserving the estate." Id.
251. In contrast, claims for damages caused during the prepetition period, CERCLA contri-
bution claims, and general unsecured contract indemnity claims are not entitled to administrative
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ply with state laws and to protect the health and safety of the public
are "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate" and
therefore entitled to administrative expense priority.112 However, this
strategy is useful against only the current owner of the hazardous waste
site. The administrative expense priority is not successful against debt-
ors such as the other section 107 PRPs who contributed to the toxic
waste problem at the site because the cleanup costs would result from
property not owned by the debtor, and would not benefit the debtor's
bankruptcy estate. 53
It may be advantageous for the PRP to litigate as a defendant to
the government's plaintiff if it fears that other liable parties may de-
clare bankruptcy. The advantage of third-party action is that a govern-
mental plaintiff has several strategies unavailable to the private party
plaintiff. The most important advantage is that regulatory actions of
governmental units, such as injunctions and fines, are excepted from
the automatic stay mechanism of section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code.25' Several 1988 appellate level decisions do not stay governmental
units from fixing penalties against bankrupt companies for environmen-
tal violations. For instance, in In re Commerce Oil Co. 255 the actions of
the state fell within the regulatory exception to the automatic stay
under both the public policy and nonpecuniary purpose tests. The
Sixth Circuit found that the state's actions of "removing, correcting or
expense priority. See In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
252. In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co., 831 F.2d 118, 123 (6th Cir. 1987); see also In re
Distrigas Corp., 66 Bankr. 382, 386 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (allowing a state a first priority admin-
istrative expense claim for reimbursement of funds spent in cleanup of debtor's contaminated
property).
253. See, e.g., Dent & Russell, 853 F.2d at 700 (denying lessor administrative expense prior-
ity against lessee debtor-in-possession's estate); Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d
137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) (denying lessor's general unsecured contract indemnity claim an adminis-
trative expense priority against the lessee debtor's estate).
254. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Although § 362(a)(1) generally stays judicial
proceedings against the debtor, § 362(b)(4), (5) excepts actions or proceedings to enforce a govern-
mental unit's regulatory or police powers. As stated in both the Senate and House Committee
Reports:
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions and proceedings by govern-
mental units to enforce police or regulatory powers. Thus, where a governmental unit is suing
a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection,
safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such
a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay. Paragraph (5) makes
clear that the exception extends to permit an injunction and enforcement of an injunction,
and to permit the entry of a money judgment, but does not extend to permit enforcement of a
money judgment.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 240, at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
6299; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 240, at 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
5838.
255. 847 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1988).
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terminating pollution and determining the severity and effect of dis-
charges on the receiving waters" and "punishing wrongdoers, deterring
illegal activity, [and] recovering remedial costs of damage to the envi-
ronment," are for protection of public health and safety and are not
grounded in the state's pecuniary property interest in its natural re-
sources. 256 The court noted that Congress enacted the police or regula-
tory exception to the automatic stay to prevent the bankruptcy court
from becoming a safe harbor for environmental offenders.257
Likewise, in United States v. Nicolet, Inc.258 the Third Circuit al-
lowed the federal government to fix damages for already expended
cleanup costs. The court reasoned that Congress gave the enforcement
of environmental laws a higher priority than preservation of the
debtor's estate for its creditors and the debtor's right to a cessation of
collection activities.2 59 The regulatory action exception is limited to in-
junctive relief, fines, penalties, the fixing or entry of a money judgment,
and possibly attorney's fees.260 One court expanded the public health
and safety exception to include punitive damages or reimbursement of
cleanup costs "in addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief. .. [because]
the deterrence function of the relief sought will render the action one to
protect the public health, safety, and welfare."'261 The automatic stay,
however, will protect the debtor from enforcement of a money judg-
ment obtained prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.262
V. CONCLUSION
Once the government establishes the elements of CERCLA liabil-
ity, a PRP is responsible for cleanup costs absent a valid statutory de-
fense. A PRP's best strategy in most situations is early settlement with
256. Id. at 295-96. The legislative history of § 362(b)(4) indicates:
This section [362(b)(4)] is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit
governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not to apply
to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or
property of the estate.
124 CONG. REc. H11,089 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6436, 6444-45
(statement of Rep. Don Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. S17,406 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6505, 6513 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini). CERCLA was enacted to
protect the public health and safety. See supra note 252. Courts should not apply the pecuniary
interest rule to bar exceptions to the automatic stay by governmental units acting pursuant to
CERCLA or other environmental statutes. See United States v. Mattiace Indus. Inc., 73 Bankr.
816, 819 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
257. Commerce Oil, 847 F.2d at 297 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro
Mktg. Group, 700 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1983)).
258. 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988).
259. See id. at 207.
260. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
261. Mattiace Indus., 73 Bankr. at 819.
262. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2), (b)(5) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see also supra note 256.
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the EPA. Settlement avoids lengthy trials on the issue of liability263 and
the associated massive transaction costs.26 Litigation dollars are better
used for the cleanup itself. SARA instituted several attractive settle-
ment options such as releases from future liability from governmental
units. A NBAR offers the dual incentives of having the EPA perform
the PRP search while allowing the settling PRP to avoid joint and sev-
eral liability. If the EPA does not agree to a NBAR, the PRP still can
pursue a mixed funding settlement that results in the PRP sharing the
response costs with the government. In particular, the preauthorized
mixed funding partial settlement offers the PRP the cost advantages of
performing the cleanup itself and a guaranteed recovery from
Superfund of the costs in excess of its liability. Regardless of the attrac-
tive settlement options, rarely will the EPA allow a PRP to pay only its
fair share in settlement if the EPA expects less than a one hundred
percent recovery of response costs.2 65 When faced with the common
problems of wastes of unknown origin or wastes attributed to defunct
or bankrupt PRPs, the EPA will apply joint and several liability and
require a PRP to pay more than its fair share percentage of cleanup
costs upfront in a settlement.266 In the majority of situations, therefore,
if the EPA neither agrees to a NBAR nor preauthorizes the PRP's re-
covery from Superfund of costs in excess of its liability, the settlement
agreement will burden the PRP with a disproportionate amount of the
cleanup costs. The PRP must then pursue nonsettling PRPs in second
tier CERCLA litigation to reduce its ultimate out-of-pocket cleanup ex-
penses. In sum, an accurate, although oversimplified, observation is that
263. Upon noting that the liability phase of trial ran more than 110 trial days, from 1983
until 1985, some commentators labeled the case of United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F.
Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985), as the "Bataan Death March" of hazardous waste litigation cases. See
Dubuc & Evans, supra note 3, at 10,198; see also United States v. Ottati & Goss, 694 F. Supp. 977
(D.N.H. 1988) (detailing the damages phase of the trial).
264. For example, in the government's suit against Conservation Chemical, the government
incurred $2 million and the PRPs incurred $5 to $12 million in pretrial expenses. Estimated
cleanup costs were $10 to $18 million. One commentator estimates the cost of answering interroga-
tories in a toxic waste disposal case involving hundreds of generator PRPs at $500,000. See Note,
Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REv. 123, 131
n.46 (1988).
The court may award the government prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, litigation costs,
and reimbursement of employees' salaries incurred as a result of the government's enforcement
action. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
850-52 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (assessing costs of hundreds of thousands of dollars as expenses already
incurred by the government, as well as prejudgment interest of nine percent per annum calculated
as of the filing date of the amended complaint), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). In addition, the Northeastern Pharmaceutical court found the defendants
jointly and severally liable for any future removal, remedial, or monitoring costs. Id.




as the PRP's disproportionate share of settlement costs increases, the
advantages of settlement decrease.
Litigation may be the preferred strategy in other situations as well.
If cleanup costs are clearly divisible and joint and several liability is not
anticipated, the PRP could achieve its goal of liability equal to its fair
share of cleanup costs in one court proceeding. Second, if any govern-
mental unit acted as an owner or operator in a nonregulatory capacity,
counterclaims or third-party claims against those governmental units
could reduce by the principle of recoupment the amount due. Third,
unlike settlements containing reopeners, once a party's liability is re-
duced to judgment following litigation, the party is protected from ad-
ditional cost recovery actions by the same governmental units. Fourth,
a 1988 House Report indicates that the EPA will be willing to compro-
mise its claim, once it considers the difficulties of collecting.26 7
In all situations, the PRP will want to identify as many other PRPs
as possible in order to reduce its equitable share of liability and poten-
tial out-of-pocket costs. The PRP bears the burden of proving appor-
tionment of liability in first tier settlement or litigation and second tier
contribution actions against other PRPs. Using section 107, the liable
party may construct a family tree of liability. The chain of title of own-
ership of the toxic waste disposal site provides a framework to chart all
previous owners of the site and their lessee operators.268 Because prior
owners or operators incur liability only if they owned or operated the
facility "at the time of disposal of hazardous substances, '269 it is neces-
sary to obtain information concerning each corporation's generation,
treatment, and disposal of hazardous substances. Although this infor-
mation typically is unavailable to one outside the corporation, govern-
ment records can provide data on past usage. If any of the hazardous
267. See SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 14, at 429.
268. The EPA prepared a procedure manual for locating PRPs for a hazardous waste site.
See OFFICE OF LEGAL & ENFORCEMENT COUNSEL, EPA, PROCEDURES FOR IDENTIFYING RESPONSIBLE
PARTIES UNCONTROLLED HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES-SUPERFUND (Feb. 1982) (final draft), reprinted
in Superfund Reauthorization: Judicial and Legal Issues: Oversight Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Law & Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1985).
269. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
270. One method of discovering the past usage of the site is to look at historical aerial photos
available from federal agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, and the states' Geologic
Survey. A search of county title and tax records, state and county landfill location records, and
federal, state, and local environmental regulatory agencies may yield names and usage information.
See SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 14, at 414.
The EPA may provide a wealth of information. The EPA is required to complete a PRP
search within a year of when a site is proposed for the NPL. Section 122(e) of SARA authorizes
the EPA to release the names and addresses of PRPs to each other, the volume and nature of
hazardous substances contributed by each PRP, and the rankings of PRPs by volume, during set-
tlement negotiations. SARA, supra note 11, § 122(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e) (Supp. IV 1986). In
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materials discovered at the site originated outside the premises, the
PRP should construct additional lists of identifiable off-site generators,
their transporters, and any subcontractors employed by the transport-
ers. One commentator advises using private detectives to locate toxic
waste transporters who may identify the generators they serviced.271
Last, the PRP should look beyond the explicit scope of section 107 to
any party connected even tenuously with the site. If any of the section
107 parties appear to be insolvent, defunct, or judgment proof, the PRP
should look to their successor corporations, parent corporations, and in-
dividual corporate officers and shareholders for recovery.
Both federal and state governments predict an increasingly aggres-
sive pursuit of cleanup actions. Additionally, a PRP is faced with strict
joint and several liability for soaring cleanup costs. In order to achieve
its goal of reducing its cleanup liability to an equitable share of the
total costs, the PRP must investigate all strategies and options availa-
ble for spreading the costs of environmental cleanup among all persons
who contributed to the damage.
Anne D. Weber
addition, its CERCLIS data base contains reports from state, local, and federal agencies on ap-
proximately 30,000 potentially hazardous sites. 53 Fed. Reg. 5192 (1988). Section 116(a) of SARA
sets goals for the EPA to complete preliminary assessments by Jan. 1, 1988, and site inspections,
where needed, by Jan. 1, 1989, for all sites listed in CERCLIS. See SARA, supra note 11, § 116(a),
42 U.S.C. § 9616(a) (Supp. IV 1986). By the end of 1988, the EPA had made a preliminary assess-
ment of approximately 27,000 sites and had inspected about 9000 sites. 53 Fed. Reg. 51,962 (1988).
Recently, the EPA expanded CERCLIS to include removal sites in addition to its coverage of
remedial and enforcement sites. Id. at 51,399.
271. See Graham, Minimizing Legal and Cleanup Costs at Hazardous Waste Sites, in Prac-
tical Approaches to Reduce Environmental Cleanup Costs, 317 P.L.I. REAL EsT. L. & PRAC. 29, 43
(1988) (noting that an expense of $300,000-$400,000 spent on identifying additional PRPs is a
prudent business strategy when faced with a landfill cleanup cost of $70-$80 million).
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